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specifically on courts – and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the
magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion
for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We
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of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the
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I.  Introduction
Recent evidence from a cross-section of countries suggests that economic inequality is
related to a variety of adverse social and economic outcomes.   Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that inequality reduces economic growth, especially in
democracies.  Barro (1996) concurs but argues that this is only true in poor countries.
Waldmann (1992) identifies adverse consequences of inequality for infant mortality.  Fajnzylber,
Lederman, and Lloayza (2002) show that countries with higher inequality suffer from more
violent crime. These results are generally robust to controls for the absolute level of poverty.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism by which inequality shapes economic and
social outcomes: subversion of institutions.
1  Since Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776),
economists agree that good economic institutions must secure private property against
expropriation – by both the neighbors and the state. Such security encourages individuals to
invest in physical capital, and so fosters economic growth.  Countries with good institutions
grow and prosper, countries without them – stagnate.   Indeed, recent evidence (Barro 1991,
DeLong and Shleifer 1993, and Knack and Keefer 1995) strongly corroborates the proposition
that institutions effectively securing property rights are conducive to economic growth.
We argue that inequality is detrimental to the security of property rights, and therefore to
growth, because it enables the rich to subvert the political, regulatory, and legal institutions of
                                                
1 There is a large theoretical literature on inequality and growth, including Aghion and
Williamson (1998), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Banerjee and Newman (1991, 1993), Benabou
(1996a, 1996b, 2002), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Perotti (1993), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), Piketty (1997), and Rajan and Zingales (2002).3
society for their own benefit.  If one person is sufficiently richer than another, and courts are
corruptible, then the legal system will favor the rich, not the just.  Likewise, if political and
regulatory institutions can be moved by wealth or influence, they will favor the established, not
the efficient.  This in turn leads the initially well situated to pursue socially harmful acts,
recognizing that the legal, political, and regulatory systems will not hold them accountable.
Inequality can encourage institutional subversion in two distinct ways.  First, the have-
nots can redistribute from the haves through violence, the political process, or other means.  Such
Robin Hood redistribution jeopardizes property rights, and deters investment by the rich.  This
mechanism is emphasized by Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and
Tabellini (1994).  Second, the haves can redistribute from the have-nots by subverting legal,
political and regulatory institutions to work in their favor.   They can do so through political
contributions, bribes, or just deployments of legal and political resources to get their way.  This
King John redistribution renders the property rights of those less well positioned – including
small entrepreneurs -- insecure, and holds back their investment.  Interestingly, the writers of the
Enlightenment, including Smith, were much more concerned with King John redistribution by
monopolies and guilds than with Robin Hood redistribution.  Here we describe a particular
version of King John redistribution similar to the one that concerned Smith .
This focus on institutional subversion by the powerful is related to the literature on
lobbying (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2001), and has appeared in a number of recent studies.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002c) examine how political
incumbents design inefficient institutions to keep themselves in power. Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002a, 2002b) consider the consequences of the subversion of institutions by the powerful for
the design of efficient legal systems and regulatory schemes.  Sonin (2002) examines the effect4
of the subversion of institutions by Russian oligarchs in the 1990s on the country’s transition.
Do (2002) examines the consequences of inequality for the evolution of institutions.
We specifically focus on the effects of unequal distribution of economic and political
resources on the workings of the legal system.  In many countries, litigants bribe judges and
legislators.  They threaten and coerce judges and prosecutors.  They spend significant resources
on attorneys to slow the workings of justice.  In any plausible model of courts, the economic and
political resources of the litigants matter for the outcome of the case.   Likewise, in a reasonable
model of regulation, such resources determine whether regulation serves public welfare or
secures rents for the regulated firm, as argued forcefully by Stigler (1971).
Inequality crucially shapes institutional subversion.  In the legal context, the rights and
wrongs of the case still matter even when the litigants are unequally matched.  But if there is
some scope for private action to influence outcomes, then relative resources also matter.  When
the two litigants are relatively equally matched, the outcome depends on the merits of the case.
But when legal armaments are unequal, the stronger litigant has an advantage in court.
When courts are subverted, there is less reason not to harm in the first place.  If the
politically strong expect to prevail in any court case brought against them, they would not respect
the property rights of others.  This breakdown in the security of property follows inequality when
institutions are weak to begin with.  The breakdown in property rights in turn deters investment,
at least by the potential victims, with adverse consequences for economic growth.
Below we present a model of a corrupt legal system illustrating these ideas. The model
also predicts that, in societies with weak institutions, small elite groups do all of the investing,
while a much larger group has no possessions and no political power.  A strong middle class
develops only when institutions protect it from the powerful.  The causality between inequality5
and injustice runs in both directions.  Initial inequality leads to subversion of institutions, but
weak institutions themselves allow only those able to protect themselves to become rich.
We illustrate the model with two case studies. First, we look at the American Gilded age
between 1865 and 1900.  Industrialization created large inequalities of wealth, which
undermined the existing legal system.  The inadequacies of the law in turn brought a public
demand for reform that was realized in the Progressive Era.  Second, we look at the transition
economies of Eastern Europe.  In several countries, privatization created a significant amount of
new private wealth.  The existing legal and political institutions were not strong enough to stand
up to the inequality in the economic and political power of different actors.  The new wealth was
able to subvert both justice and other institutions.  The rise of Vladimir Putin in Russia can be
seen as a popular response to the institutional breakdown.  Finally, we present some cross-
country evidence supporting the prediction that the negative impact of inequality on growth is
more pronounced in countries with weaker rule of law.
II.  The Model
Our model of inequality and the breakdown of judicial systems proceeds in three stages.
In the first stage, individuals choose whether or not to invest in a project, which if successful,
yields a return of D.  This investment has a cost  D D < θ  (there is no discounting).  In the
absence of impediments, such as insecure property rights, everyone invests.   The assumption
that the investment project is of a fixed size is not innocuous.  It implies that even the rich do not
invest more than D.  After presenting our basic results, we consider relaxing this assumption.
In the second stage, each individual is randomly paired with another, and each member of
this pair then decides whether or not to expropriate the other’s investment.  There is no6
possibility of expropriating someone who had not invested.  Expropriation can take the form of
routine theft, or of destruction of investment, entailing a loss of the entire project (i.e. D) to the
victim.  The offender gains  D D < δ  from his act.
The interpretation of the model relies heavily on what kinds of harm and expropriation
we have in mind.  In some instances, it can be a direct taking of property.  More realistically, one
can think of cheating in a transaction, using illegitimate – or illegal – practices to damage a
business partner or a competitor, or even using friendly government officials to deny a potential
competitor a license or to shut him down.  One of the parties in a transaction can actually be a
government official holding up an investor rather than a private individual.  Although we use the
words theft, expropriation, and crime to describe these actions, we are only focused on civil
disagreements, so all the litigation we describe is between private parties.
If one individual harms the other, there is a possibility of legal retaliation.  At some cost,
C, the victim can go to court and seek damages equal to the loss of property.  In court, a judge
decides whether the claim is justified, and if so awards “D” to the victim.  If the judge rules for
the defendant, there is no transfer of cash.  We assume that this award amount is fixed (i.e. there
is no possibility for double or triple damages).
Our objective is to determine the overall amount of harm in the society, and to trace its
negative impact on investment. We proceed recursively.  First, we examine the outcome of the
trial conditional upon theft having occurred and the victim suing.  We then examine the decision
to sue.  Next, we consider the decision to expropriate, and finally the impact of equilibrium
expropriation on investment.7
 The Outcome of the Trial
The trial stage of this model also has a temporal structure.  First, both the plaintiff and the
defendant simultaneously and separately offer bribes to the judge.  These bribes are secret gifts,
and no contract can be written based on them.  We denote the plaintiff’s bribe by  P B  and the
defendant’s by  D B .  We assume agents face no credit constraints.
2
Bribes are not contractually binding, but a judge who accepts one makes it possible for
the briber to punish him.   Punishment takes the form of revealing the bribe and causing the
judge either embarrassment or true legal problems.  Only an actual briber can punish the judge.
Punishment is costless to impose if the briber has lost the case.  If the briber has won, his victory
is voided when the bribe is revealed.  Thus, no briber who wins the case ever punishes the judge.
We only consider equilibria where bribers who are unsuccessful in the case actually
punish the judge rather than go away.  Since punishment is free, this focus can be justified either
by reputational concerns, or by utility of vengeance.  The punishment from the plaintiff is  P Z
and from the defendant D Z .  P Z and D Z  are exogenous parameters representing the political
power of the two litigants.  A low value of Z suggets that an impotent individual who accuses the
judge of taking a bribe will not get far.  A high value of Z suggests that the politically powerful
have a wide variety of means of punishing judges who do not stay bought.  In the population as a
whole, there is a continuous distribution G(Z) of political power, and we assume that D exceeds
the maximum value of Z.  The political power of each actor is perfectly observable.
                                                
2 An earlier draft show that the presence of credit constraints creates a second possible type of
inequality, where unequal access to credit markets can also increase theft and corruption.8
The judge obtains utility of V from “doing the right thing.”  This can be thought of as the
reputational loss from having his decision reversed on appeal, or as a pure utility gain from
following the law (Posner 1995).  The value of V differs among judges and is described by a
density function f(V) and a cumulative distribution F(V).  We assume that V> 0.  The value of V
becomes known as soon as the lawsuit is filed, but not before (i.e., the plaintiff does not know
the identity of the judge before filing the case).
The Decision of the Judge
After the judge has taken a bribe, his decision depends only on V and the two Z
parameters.   The level of the bribe influences the outcome only insofar as it induces the judge to
take the bribe in the first place, and thereby puts him in a compromising position where he can
be punished.  The judge always accepts the bribe of the person whom he plans to favor, but
situations where the judge takes two bribes are not an equilibrium, since the losing litigant is
always better off not having bribed at all.
3   Thus, the only equilibria are ones in which the judge
takes exactly one bribe and rules in favor of the litigant whose bribe he has accepted.
What will be the equilibrium bribes?  If  D Z V > , then even if the judge takes the
defendant’s bribe, he will favor the plaintiff.  In that case, the plaintiff offers a bribe of zero and
still wins.  If  D Z V < , then it is useful to know that:
Lemma 1:  No one’s bribe ever strictly exceeds his ability to punish, i.e.  D D B Z ≥  and  P P B Z ≥ .
                                                
3 Generically, there are no mixed strategy equilibria where the judge takes both bribes and
randomizes since the judge  (almost everywhere) strictly favors one of the litigants.9
This lemma guides us to the equilibrium.  When  D D B Z >  and  P P B Z > , the judge only
takes the bribe of the defendant and rules for the defendant when  P D B V B + > .  In equilibrium,
either the defendant sets  P D Z V B + =  and wins (when  P D Z V Z + > ) or the plaintiff sets
) , 0 ( V Z Max B P P − =  and wins (when  P D Z V Z + < ).  The equilibrium losing bids are
infinitesimally less than  P Z  and  D Z  respectively (i.e.  P Z  and  D Z ).  These bids are consistent
with equilibrium, because if the winners bid anything less, they lose, and anything more is
wasteful.  If the losers bid anything more, their bids are accepted, but this does not change the
outcome and the loser gains nothing from a lower bid.  Formally:
Proposition 1:   If  P D Z Z V − > , then  ) , 0 ( V Z Max B D P − = ,  D D Z B = , the plaintiff wins the
case, and only the plaintiff’s bribe is taken. If  P D Z Z V − < , then  P P Z B = ,  P D Z V B + = , the
defendant wins, and only the defendant’s bribe is taken.
Proposition 1 establishes that the critical determinant of the legal outcome is whether V is
greater or less than the difference in the abilities to punish the judge.
The Decision to Use the Courts
The cost of using a court is C.  This cost covers the filing fee, legal representation, and
delays associated with civil litigation.
4
                                                
4 Djankov et al. (2002b) present evidence that legal procedures are heavily formalized in most
countries, and that the time and financial costs of pursuing even the simplest disputes are
extremely high.10
If the potential plaintiff knew the value of V, he would file the case whenever
P D Z Z V − >  and not otherwise.   However, the plaintiff must base his decision to sue on the
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The following proposition follows:
Proposition 2: If  C Z D P > − , then for any plaintiff with a fixed level  Max Max P V Z Z − < , there
exists a value of  P D Z Z >  denoted by  ) (
*
P D Z Z  at which the plaintiff is indifferent between suing
and not suing.  For values of  D Z  below  ) (
*
P D Z Z , the plaintiff always prefers to sue.  For values
of D Z  above  ) (
*
P D Z Z , the plaintiff does not sue.  The value of 
*
D Z  rises with  P Z , falls with C,
and rises with D.  If we write ε ν + = V , where ν  is constant across judges, then  ) (
*
P D Z Z  rises
with the level of ν .
This proposition makes several points.   First, the willingness to use courts rises with the
honesty of the judges (ν ) and falls with litigation costs.  Also, courts are more likely to be used
when damages are large.  More importantly for our argument, courts are always used when the
victim is more powerful than the offender.  Only when the offender is much more powerful than
the victim does the former walk away from the crime.
    This proposition helps us to understand the circumstances in which courts are used.  In
countries where judges are particularly venal, we expect courts to be rarely used.  When courts11
are corrupt, moreover, inequality becomes very important.  Two roughly equally powerful
individuals would use courts, but significant inequality between them keeps them away from
courts (at least when the plaintiff is weaker than the defendant).  High costs of using the legal
system also deter the potential litigants.
 The Decision to Harm
When deciding whether or not to commit an offense initially, the potential offender
assumes that the victim will respond optimally.  We imagine that two individuals are matched
and both simultaneously decide on whether to harm the other.  There is no connection between
the two decisions to harm, so we think of them as separate choices.  We assume that, while V is
not known, each party knows his own characteristics and those of his match when deciding
whether or not to harm. At this point, we think of the power of the potential offender as  A Z  and
the power of the victim as  B Z .  The offender ends up being the defendant in court and the victim
ends up being the plaintiff.  Conceivably, we could end up having two offenders and two victims
in a pair: a truly Hobbesian outcome.
If the offender knows that the victim will not go to court, he chooses to harm.  Thus, if
A Z  is greater than ) (
*
B D Z Z , the offender acts with impunity.  We are not allowing non-legal
forms of redress, but inequality is probably even more important in deterring weak victims from
punishing strong offenders outside of courts.
The next result follows immediately:
Lemma 2: If C Z D P > − , an offense does not occur unless  A Z  is greater than  B Z .12
Proof: If  D P Z Z > , then the plaintiff always wins the case, and so always sues.  For this reason,
the potential offender always loses from the offense.
It follows from Lemma 2 that when two people interact, only the politically stronger of
the two attacks the other.  Naturally, this result hinges on the fact that damages are always
observable and there are not hidden offenses. Indeed, this framework is unhelpful for thinking
about street crime with limited detection.
When C is high, both individuals may choose not to use the courts, and anarchy ensues.
At the extreme, if C > D, no one ever uses the courts and all property is violated.
We focus on the case where  C Z D P > − , so harm is done when  A Z  >  ) (
*
B D Z Z .  Harm
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If the offender knows that  A B D Z Z Z > ) (
* , then he only harms if  D δ  exceeds (2).  This leads to
our third proposition:
Proposition 3: If the victim sues for damages, then an offense occurs if and only if  A Z  is greater
than  B B A Z Z Z > ) (
* * , where 
* *
A Z  is falling with δ  and D and rising with  B Z .  If  ε ν + = V , where
ν  is constant across judges, then  ) (
* *
B A Z Z  rises with the level of ν .    When D is sufficiently
large relative to  P Z , D Z , and C, then  ) ( ) (
* * *
B A B D Z Z Z Z >  and ) 1 ( ) (
1 * * δ − + ≈
− F Z Z Z B B A .13
This proposition tells us that offenses may occur even against victims who will sue, but
occur more rarely when they are more wasteful and when victims are more powerful.  Honest
judges protect property.  Somewhat more interestingly, expropriation rises with the scale, D, of
investment.  The reason is that the benefit of an offense scales with D but only part of the cost
scales with D.  The costs that represent bribe payments are independent of D, which makes
expropriation more attractive as the scale of enterprise rises (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002b).
When D is particularly large, two forces come into play.  First,  ) ( ) (
* * *
B A B D Z Z Z Z > ,
which means that some harms are litigated.  The marginal violator expects to be taken to court.
When D is sufficiently large,  ) (
*
B D Z Z  determines whether there is an offense in a match.
Second, when D is large,  ) 1 ( ) (
1 * * δ − + ≈
− F Z Z Z B B A .  This means that only relative, not
absolute, power determines whether an offense takes place.  There is a constant power gap
between a potential victim and the marginal violator who exploits him.  This gap is a function of
the level of waste and of the honesty of the judge.
The combination of propositions tells us that socially damaging actions are more likely
when the two parties are unequal in their resources, or more precisely, when the aggressor has
much more political power than the victim.  Also, whichever proposition applies, the level of
harm is determined by the honesty of the judge.  In cases where D is low and Proposition 2
applies, which is more likely when litigation costs are high, then these costs become a critical
determinant of the security of property.14
The Overall Level of Harm
To assess the overall level of harm, we assume that, in every period, two random
members of society are matched and one has an opportunity to harm the other.   Our interest is in
the impact of social inequality on the level of such expropriation.
For the following proposition, we assume that all the possible distributions of Z have
densities that are single-peaked and symmetric.   We use the following definition:
Definition: The density function  ) ( ~ z g  is a single-troughed, symmetric mean preserving spread of
the density function g(z) if  ) ( ~ ) ( z g z g −  is single-peaked around the median of z and symmetric.
Proposition 4: If D is sufficiently large, then the level of harm rises as the variance of Z is
increased through a single-troughed, symmetric, mean-preserving spread.
Proposition 4 gets at the heart of the paper.  It states that an increase in the inequality of
power or resources raises the overall level of expropriation.  In the model, this works through
subversion of justice.  Unequal resources enable some individuals to expropriate others with
impunity.  Unsurprisingly, expropriation follows.
In the next proposition, we consider the distribution of matches and its dependence on the
social organization of the society.   We model the possibility that, in some societies, people
interact with others more closely matched to them in political power, and examine the impact of
such closeness on expropriation.  Specifically, we assume that  µ λ λα ) 1 ( − + = Z , where α  is a
random variable that is common to any match, and µ  is an idiosyncratic term.  The parameter λ
captures the degree of social connectivity.  For this structure, we can establish:15
Proposition 5: If D is sufficiently large, then an increase in λ  reduces the amount of
expropriation in the society.
When two random individuals in a society have more comparable political power, it is
less likely that the inequality of resources leads to a breakdown in justice.  Traditional
environments that depend on interactions among similarly situated individuals are less likely to
face problems of expropriation than the highly volatile modernizing environments where the
weak interact with the strong.   Alternatively, an influx of powerful outsiders can lead to a
breakdown in property rights.
The Level of Investment
To complete the model, we return to the investment decision.  For any individual with
political resources Z, the expected return from investment minus the expected losses from harm
plus the expected gains from using the courts equal:
∫∫ ∫



























dZ Z g C dV V f V Z dV V Df D D Z Z G θ    (3)
The first two terms  D D Z Z G A θ − )) ( (
* *  reflect the expected returns if the investment is
made times the probability that the investment is not expropriated  )) ( (
* * Z Z G A minus the cost of
investment  D θ .  The third term,16
∫∫ ∫

























dZ Z g C dV V f V Z dV V Df , reflects the expected benefits of
using the courts minus the expected bribes minus court fees.   Investment occurs if and only if
expression (3) is positive.
We now assume that V is deterministic and equals ν .  This assumption is not absolutely
necessary, but it simplifies the algebra considerably.  Since risk is eliminated, victims use the
court system if and only if they know they are going to win, i.e. if and only if  ν − > A Z Z .  In
this case, investors are expropriated if and only if they encounter a potential offender whose level
of Z is more than ν  higher than their own, and in fact, the court system is never used.  The threat
of litigation is just a deterrent to potential offenders.  The expected return from investment is
equal  D D Z G θ υ − + ) ( , and we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 6: If  ) ( υ θ + > Z G , whereZ  denotes the minimum value of Z, there exists a value of
Z, denoted  I Z , at which individuals are indifferent between investing and not investing.  For
values of Z above  I Z , investing is preferred to not investing, whereas for values of Z below  I Z ,
not investing is preferred to investing.  Moreover,
(a) The value of  I Z  is increasing with θ .
(b) The value of  I Z  is decreasing with ν .
(c) If the variance of Z is increased through a mean-preserving spread, then the value of
I Z  rises if and only if  5 . > θ .
(d) If  µ λ λα ) 1 ( − + = Z , where α  is a random variable that is common to the match, and
µ  is an idiosyncratic term, then proportion of the population that invests is increasing with λ .17
The condition  ) ( v Z G + > θ  is necessary to assure that investment is not attractive to the
least powerful member of society.
According to part (a), investment declines when its price increases.  According to part
(b), investment increases as judges become more honest.
The result on increasing the variance of power requires that the returns from investment
are not too high, i.e.  5 . > θ .   If θ  is less than .5, undertaking a project is understood to be highly
risky, and the marginal investor succeeds (without being expropriated) if and only if he is lucky
enough to meet a very weak individual.  An increase in inequality increases the probability of
encountering somebody very weak and therefore raises the likelihood of investment.
The final comparative static tells us that connectivity among individuals is also
important.  When individuals interact with different people, then likelihood expropriation tends
to increase, and therefore investment declines.
The essence of Proposition 6 is that in weak legal systems, politically impotent
individuals are unlikely to invest.  Under our assumption that each person can only invest a fixed
amount, how many invest determines the overall levels of investment.  But this assumption may
not always hold: in many cases, individuals with power can expand their own levels of
investment if insecure property rights deter others from investing.
A Digression
We briefly illustrate the consequences of relaxing the assumption that investment per
individual is fixed.  To this end, we simplify the model even further, and assume that there are
only two levels of Z: Z  and Z .  Investors with the high level of Z are never harmed.  The18
people will low levels of Z are harmed if they encounter a high Z type and if  Z Z − < ν .  Denote
the proportion of individuals with Z =Z  by π .  Consider a transition from a situation where
Z Z − > ν  to one where  Z Z − < ν  due to either a change in the level of corruption of the
judiciary or an increase in the level of inequality.  If  π θ > and this transition occurs, the low Z
types stop investing.
   However, this may not reduce aggregate investment if the high Z types then undertake
the foregone projects.  Suppose that individuals can undertake surplus projects that have not been
undertaken by others, but at a cost for the marginal project of  ) (N θ , where N reflects the total
number of extra projects that any one person undertakes.  If increases in inequality or judicial
corruption push the weaker citizens out of investment, then there are two scenarios to consider.
First, the high Z types may undertake all of the surplus projects.  In this case, there is no
reduction in investment, and the welfare losses from weak property rights just come from the fact
that high rather than low cost individuals are undertaking projects.  Second, only some of the
projects may be undertaken.  In this case, ignoring integer constraints, the high Z types invest
until the point where  ) (N θ  equals one.  The social losses in this case combine the loss from
underinvestment with the loss from extra costs.
To formalize this point, assume that after their first project individuals are able to invest a
continuous amount.  If the number of extra projects is denoted by I, assume that the cost of this
extra investment is  2 /
2 I I Θ + θ .   Assume also that  1 / ) 1 ( > − Θ + π π θ , so that there are some
surplus projects, and that each high Z type invests in exactly  Θ − / ) 1 ( θ  surplus projects.  In that
case, the per capita social loss resulting from moving from a situation where property rights are
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π θ D (4)
 This equation makes it clear that the social loss from an increase in inequality or a
breakdown in rule of law depends on π , the proportion of people who are left able to invest, and
on Θ , the extent to which having the wrong people invest raises costs.  There are two natural
interpretations of Θ .  First, it might just represent the decreasing returns to any one individual
managing more investments.  Second, it might represent the losses from failure to utilize person-
specific knowledge or talents in investment.  WhenΘ is low, there are few costs from having all
investment undertaken by a few people.  When Θ  is high, then such an outcome leads to
substantial welfare losses.
This distinction may explain why breakdowns in the protection of property rights may be
more important in some phases of development than in others.  During industrialization,
especially for follower countries that are able to copy the technology of leader countries, scale
economies may mean that Θ  is low and there are few losses from concentrating investment in
the hands of a few oligarchs.  In other phases of development, when local innovation, local
knowledge, small business formation, and entrepreneurial initiative are important, Θ is much
higher and it may be more costly to a society to experience a breakdown in property rights.
Going back to the original model with fixed investment per capita, Proposition 6 also
sheds light on the evolution of income distribution. Since  I Z  is the minimum value of Z at which
people invest,  ) ( 1 I Z G −  is the proportion of the population that is investing and growing richer
over time.  When  I Z  is low, a broad spectrum of the society is investing and over time gradually20
enriching themselves. However, when  I Z  is high, then only the very powerful are investing and
only they are growing rich over time.
This logic provides us with another link between inequality and injustice.  A weak
judicial system, which is described by a high value of C or a low value of ν , leads not only to
low levels of investment (or misallocated investment) across society as a whole, but also to a
very unequal income distribution.  Only the most powerful members of a society—those able to
protect their investment— actually invest.  Conversely, a low value of C and a high value of ν
enable a wide swath of society to actually invest and be sure that they can keep their profits.
This argument suggests that the development of a large middle class relies on the existence of
strong judicial institutions.
Another way of putting this is that, in nations with weak judicial institutions, the
equilibrium correlation between political power and wealth has to be high.  Only the politically
powerful, those with high values of Z, are able to protect their investments.  In countries with
stronger institutions, the connection between political power and wealth is weaker, as individuals
with a wide range of political resources can become wealthy.
These results may help explain why England developed a large middle class before other
European countries.  The stronger legal protection afforded by the common law meant that an
English merchant could invest with less fear of expropriation than a French one.  As a result,  an
English middle class could develop when the French middle class could not.  In nations with still
weaker institutions, such as Tsarist Russia, the middle class was even smaller than in France.  If
the demand from the middle class facilitates investment in fixed cost technologies (as argued by
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989), then strong legal institutions not only support investment
directly, but also have an indirect benefit by changing the distribution of income.21
As a final aside, we have so far treated Z as an exogenous parameter.  In reality, Z is a
valuable asset and individuals would take actions to expand their level of political power.
Investment in Z may take the form of bribing politicians on a regular basis, investing in media
outlets or acquiring connections.  One way of doing this is to combine and form alliances and for
firms to merge.  The incentive to invest in Z is stronger in weak legal regimes than in strong
ones. We should thus expect to see combinations arising in periods and in places where legal
institutions are failing.
III.  The U.S. During the Gilded Age
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002b) argue that many American institutions failed to keep up
with the needs of the Gilded Age.  In 1841, DeToqueville surveys the United States and finds a
country that is marked both by its equality and by the strength of its legal institutions.  He
comments that “Men are [in America] seen on a greater equality in point of fortune and intellect,
or, in other words, more equal in their strength, than in any other country of the world, or in any
age of which history has preserved the remembrance.”
In DeToqueville’s view, equality of wealth is accompanied by relatively strong
institutions.  He writes “in the United States, I never heard anyone accused of spending his
wealth buying votes.” Indeed (by comparison with the later age), it is utterly surprising how little
space DeToqueville devotes to the subversion of institutions.  While he worries about excessive
democratic tendencies (which he sees as being checked by strong courts), he is not concerned
with the rich overwhelming the political and legal systems.
In the next 50 years, the United States changed.  Inequality rose significantly in the 19
th
century, as industrialization and the increasing size of the American market made a number of22
Americans extremely rich.  While there is some debate on wage inequality, Lindert and
Williamson (1985) and Lindert (2000) document growing wealth inequality during this time,
including a striking rise in the number of enormous fortunes.
The growth of individual fortunes paralleled, indeed derived from, the growth of large
companies and trusts.   In 1832, the McLane report finds only 106 manufacturing firms with
assets greater than $100,000 in the United States.  In contrast, Chandler (1977) finds 278 firms
with more than $20 million in assets in 1917.  Much of this change came about because of scale
economies inherent in the shift to a mass industrial economy.  Some of this expansion in scale,
however, was a response to the opportunities created by weak institutions.
Wealth inequality fueled the subversion of institutions.  While DeToqueville sees
magistrates as upright guardians of democracy, the muckrakers 50 years later describe a judicial
system subverted by wealth.  The great protagonists of the Gilded Age subverted institutions as
part of normal business practice (Josephson 1934).  The famous Erie Railroad battle between
Commodore Vanderbilt and Jay Gould culminated in massive bribery of both the judges and the
New York State legislature.  The financial operations of Jay Gould and Jim Fisk were abetted by
their alliance with William Marcy Tweed who supplied friendly judges on demand (Callow
1966).  Corporate battles against unionization were fought with the weapons of state police.
One obvious example of the wealthy subverting the government is the massive transfers
of land to the railroad and traction companies.  Both inter-city and intra-city transportation firms
were heavily subsidized through massive grants of public lands.  Growth of public transport
industry was stimulated by long leases of public space (e.g., 999 years) for nominal fees (e.g.,
one dollar).   Massive bribes to public officials lubricated this generosity (Glaeser 2001).  The23
story of the American transport industry in the Gilded Age is one of powerful firms bribing
politicians and judges to receive large quantities of previously public land.
One reason for the growth in the scale of business during this period was the
accumulation of political power.  The Republican leader of the Senate, Nelson Aldrich,
organized the creation of trusts.  The profitability of trusts came not just from monopoly pricing
(subversion of markets), but also from their ability to manipulate the Senate and the courts.
Government policies, such as the high and pervasive tariffs, responded to the influence of
powerful firms, and the trusts came about in part to enhance this influence.
Did the breakdown of judicial institutions during the Gilded Age hurt growth and
investment?  After all, the Gilded Age is often seen as a time of remarkable growth of the
American economy.  This reputation for expansion should not obscure the fact that economic
growth during 1860-1910 was much slower than that afterwards.  The weaknesses of the system
did not cause a collapse, but the institutional failures may have unduly limited the expansion.
Indeed, as our discussion following Proposition 6 suggests, the major investments of the new
industrial economy could have been efficiently undertaken by relatively few large firms, but – at
the same time – the lack of law and order may have stymied smaller scale entrepreneurship.
The institutional failures of the Gilded Age elicited a major political response.  First the
Progressives and then the New Dealers changed the institutions to counter the power of big
firms.  Rising taxation and regulation, including the regulation of interstate commerce, the anti-
trust laws, the securities laws, and other forms of state intervention – were central elements of
reform. Anti-trust policy aimed as much at eliminating the political power of trusts as at cutting
their monopoly rents.  Hofstadter (1955, p. 227) writes that trust busting was based on “a fear
founded in political realities – the fear that the great business combinations, being the only24
centers of wealth and power, would be able to lord it over all other interests and thus put an end
to traditional democracy.”
Without endorsing the wisdom of all the reforms, we can agree that the subversion of
institutions was countered peacefully and effectively.  The fundamental strength of American
democracy ultimately meant that when the public sought to restrain the power of the mighty,
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and F.D.R. had the tools to do so.  A vigorous array of
government policies compressed the distribution of income between 1900 and 1960.  Other
policies protected the legal rights of the weak.  The excesses of the Gilded Age were eventually
corrected and inequality declined, as did corruption.
IV. Transition Economies
The transition of economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from
socialism to capitalism started around 1991, following the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of
communism in the U.S.S.R.   At that time, many economists cautioned against the backlash by
the losers from economic transition.  Those left behind by the privatization and restructuring of
former state enterprises, the argument went, will use their political muscle to stop and possibly
reverse future reforms, and indeed might return to government socialist or communist parties
(Kornai 1990).  Those involved in reform and privatization programs took this argument to heart,
and attempted to design policies that would minimize the risk of such a backslide (Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny 1995).  These concerns were intimately related to fears that Robin Hood
redistribution undermines investment and growth.
Despite the widespread fear, a populist backlash never materialized.  Several countries –
including Poland -- elected socialist and pseudo-communist politicians in the aftermath of radical25
reforms, but these politicians typically continued the reforms with less radical market rhetoric.
Reforms in many countries did indeed stall, or even failed to get started, but the problem was not
a popular backlash, but rather the capture of political and legal institutions by the winners of
initial changes.  In some countries, particularly those in Central Asia, the winners from the
political transition gained control over state assets personally, and transformed their countries
into crony capitalist dictatorships.  In other countries, of which the most conspicuous is Russia,
the economic transformation itself created a cadre of winners who succeeded in subverting the
institutions of the state to further their political and economic influence.
This reality of transition was first recognized by Joel Hellman (1998), who referred to it
as “winner take all” reforms.  His insight has since been extended in both theoretical and
empirical work relating to Russian and other countries in the Former Soviet Union (Sonin 2002,
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).  Because it fits very naturally with our analysis, we focus
on Russia in the following discussion.
Russia’s mass privatization program, conducted between 1992 and 1994, created nearly
40 million individual shareholders in the more than 14,000 medium and large-scale enterprises
that were auctioned off.  Through secondary trading, however, ownership in many of these firms
– particularly the valuable ones – quickly concentrated in the hands of relatively few industrial
groups, which often included commercial banks as part of their organizations.  Persons
controlling these groups, known as oligarchs, moved to consolidate their economic and political
control.  Using their banks, they acquired additional firms, including those in the energy sector.
They used their influence over Parliament and courts to dilute minority shareholders with legal
impunity, and thereby to consolidate their control over business groups.  They used political
contributions, and the government’s lack of funds, to convince the government to pursue a26
"shares-for-loans” program, which transferred to the oligarchs the control over several of the
country’s most valuable enterprises.  They used their resources to acquire newspapers and
television stations, the crucial instruments of political influence.  Last but not least, they used
their economic and political power to stop further reforms of law and order, including corporate
governance, commercial and central banking, and securities markets.  Ultimately, several of the
oligarchs simply joined the government. Subversion of political and legal institutions brought
crony capitalism to Yeltsin’s Russia.
Russia of the 1990s exhibits many elements of the injustice of inequality we have noted.
These include the breakdown of legal institutions, the subversion of political institutions –
including the Parliament, the government, and the Presidency, the formation of industrial groups
driven by political (and ultimately economic) considerations rather than traditional efficiency, as
well as the consequent discrimination in economic policy against smaller firms.  Recent critiques
of Russia’s transition have identified the institutional discrimination against smaller,
entrepreneurial firms – as the culprit of the country’s economic difficulties (McKinsey and Co.
1999).   In line with this analysis, Russia has some of the highest levels of regulation of smaller
firms in the world (Djankov et al. 2002a), as one would indeed fear from our model.  Perhaps not
surprisingly, economic growth in the 1990s was slow, especially that of small business.
   In some respects, the political response to the end of the Yeltsin era is similar to that in
the U.S. circa 1900.  Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, was elected largely on a law and order
platform.  He immediately moved to pursue legal reform and to increase the police powers of the
state.  He greatly undermined, if not destroyed, the political influence of the oligarchs, in some
instances confiscating their assets and forcing them to emigrate.  In the first two to three years of
Putin regime, Russia has grown rapidly, although some of this growth is surely attributable to27
high oil prices.  It remains to be seen whether the reduction in institutional subversion through
centralization of political power actually manifests itself in long-term economic growth.
Whatever the ultimate outcome, Russia in the 1990s offers a most remarkable illustration of how
vast inequality of economic and political resources, in the context of initial institutional
weakness, can lead to a substantial breakdown of law and order.
V.  Cross-Country Evidence
As our last piece of evidence, we present the cross-country relationship between
inequality and growth.  A large literature, including Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and Barro (1996), examines the  inequality-growth nexus.  In our model, the
adverse effect of inequality on growth is especially pronounced in countries with weak legal
regimes.  Countries with strong rule of law should not see (as strong) a negative relationship
between inequality and growth.  Below we test this prediction.  Empirical work in this area,
including that presented below, is compromised by the endogeneity of the variables and by
reverse causation.  For this reason, we see this evidence as only suggestive.
We use the Gini coefficient calculated by Deininger and Squire (1996) as a measure of
income inequality.  We use a “rule of law” index, which is an assessment of the law and order
tradition of the country from the International Country Risk Guide, as a measure of the quality of
legal institutions .  Specifically, we code countries as having strong legal systems if they have a
value for the Rule of Law Index that is greater than the mean value for the sample.  We then
interact this Rule of Law dummy with the Gini Coefficient, and run a regression of the growth
rate in per capita GDP on the Gini, the dummy for rule of law and the interaction.  The result is:
(4) GDP Growth= 4.7   -    .09*Gini   - 3.7*Rule of Law Dummy + .11*Interaction
                            (1.3)       (.03)              (1.8)                                     (.04)28
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Number of Observations=87, R-Squared=.21.
This result is consistent with the model.  Inequality is bad for growth, but only in
countries with poor rule of law.  For the countries with good rule of law, inequality has no effect
on economic growth.  Thus the negative effects of inequality may well work through the law and
order channel that our model points to.  In countries like the U.S., which have strong legal
institutions, inequality is not likely to be a problem.  In countries where institutions are not as
strong, inequality may lead to institutional breakdown, reduction and misallocation of
investment, and consequently lower growth.
VI.  Conclusion.
This paper describes a possibly important adverse effect of inequality on economic and
social progress: the subversion of legal, regulatory, and political institutions by the powerful.
We argued that this risk indeed became a reality in the U.S. during the Gilded Age and in Russia
in the 1990s, as well as many other places.   The U.S. was remarkably successful in confronting
the problems of institutional subversion, the verdict on Russia remains open.
It is tempting to conclude from this analysis that, especially in countries with weak
political institutions, inequality is a source of institutional breakdown and should be countered at
all costs through redistribution.  Some of our discussion is not that distant from Marxist analyses
of imperialism, colonialism, and globalization, which see institutional capture by the powerful –
whether local oligarchs or foreign capital – as the crucial reason for underdevelopment (Baran
1957).  Although we share with the radical writers a concern about the inequality of political29
power, we do not find in these writings much to agree with.  More importantly, the solutions we
envisage – institutional reform rather than redistribution -- are very different.
In the last two decades, economists have begun to recognize more clearly the
possibilities, and the promise, of institutional reform.  Successful changes in institutions, from
the introduction of trial by jury in 12
th century England, to Meiji restoration, to Progressive
reforms in the U.S., to transplantation of Western institutions to developing countries, radically
changed both economic and social performance.  At the more microeconomic level, several
countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia pursued successful institutional
reforms of banking and corporate governance in the last 20 years (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer
2001, La Porta et al. 2000).   Many of these reforms have gone a long way toward reducing the
scope of institutional subversion.
In many countries, the political response to institutional subversion by the rich was not
institutional reform, but rather a turn to massive Robin Hood redistribution, often in the context
of a social revolution.  Such revolutions replaced the old oligarchies of the rich with the new
socialist or institutionalist oligarchies.  In some cases, the massive redistribution that followed
dramatically slowed economic and social progress.  In other cases, the principal effect has been a
change in elites, with continued capture of institutions by those in power.  Dornbusch and
Edwards (1991) present a depressing account of macroeconomic populism in Latin America,
motivated largely by redistribution, and setting back the development of the region by decades.
We do not believe that the best solution to King John redistribution is Robin Hood
redistribution.  Rather, we point to instances where countries experienced peaceful institutional
reforms that addressed the problem of subversion.  There are useful lessons in these experiences.30
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Lemma 1:  The judge always takes any bribe greater than Z, and as the only point of the bribe is
to put the judge into a compromising position, no one ever offers a bribe strictly greater than Z,
since the litigant could always get the judge to accept a slightly smaller bribe that is still greater
than Z.  If  P D Z Z V − > , then  ) , 0 ( V Z Max B D P − = ,  D D Z B = , the plaintiff wins the case, and
only the plaintiff’s bribe is taken. If  P D Z Z V − < , then  P P Z B = ,  P D Z V B + = , the defendant
wins, and only the defendant’s bribe is taken.
Proposition 1: First, we prove that the strategies in the claim describe an equilibrium, and then
we show that they are unique.  First, consider the case where  P D Z Z V − > .  The plaintiff gains
nothing from offering more (after all, he wins the case).  If the plaintiff offers less, he loses, and
the value of the case is higher than the bribe (by assumption).  The defendant has no benefit from
reducing his bribe: he is losing the case anyway and does not care about offering less since the
bribe is not paid anyway.  The defendant does not pay more because he is constrained (by lemma
1), i.e. if he paid more the judge would take his bribe and still rule against him.
To prove that the first equilibrium is unique, consider any other pair of bribes.  First, the plaintiff
cannot get less than  D Z V D − + , since he can always offer  V Z D −  and win the case.  Thus, he
never offers more than  V Z D − .  Suppose the plaintiff offers less than  V Z D − .  In that case, the
plaintiff could offer ε + +V BP , which is a winning bribe, and the plaintiff would lose, and he
would therefore be worse off than if he offered  V Z D − .    Thus, in all equilibria, the plaintiff
offers  V Z D − .  The defendant is not going to offer more than  D Z  by lemma 1.  If the defendant31
offered less, then the plaintiff would likewise reduce his bribe, but that can’t be an equilibrium
because we have already shown that the plaintiff’s bribe equals  V Z D − .
To prove that the actions in the case where  P D Z Z V − <  are an equilibrium, we note that the
defendant never offers more than this amount since he wins the case anyway, and never offers
less, because he would then lose the case and be strictly worse off.    The plaintiff cannot offer
more (by lemma 1) and gains nothing from offering less.
To prove uniqueness, we note that the defendant can always win by offering  V Z P + , so he
cannot get less than  V Z P − − .  If the defendant offered more than  V Z P + , he would earn
strictly less than this, so it would not be an equilibrium.  If the defendant offers less than this, the
plaintiff would offer  ε + −V BD  and win the case, and thus the defendant would be better by
offering  V Z P + .  The plaintiff cannot offer more than  P Z  by lemma 1, and cannot offer less
since that would induce the defendant to offer less than  V Z P + .
Proposition 2:
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always wins the case, and  pays less than   P Z D −  which is greater than C, so suing is optimal.  If
P Max D Z V Z + > , then the defendant always wins, and the case generates negative returns.   The
derivative of this with respect to  D Z  equals:   ∫
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*
D Z  at which
∫ ∫
> − =








P D Z V
Z
Z Z V
D dV V Df dV V f V Z D C ,( A 1 )
and it is always optimal to sue if  D Z  is less than 
*
D Z  and always optimal not to sue otherwise.





























∂ P D P D
P
D Z Z D Z Z f
Z
Z




















D d D d Z D C ,( A 1 ’ )
where (.) φ  is the density function for ε .   Differentiation then yields:
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Proposition 3: When  B A Z Z = , the offender loses the lawsuit and is worse off by committing the
theft.  When  A Z  is sufficiently high, then the probability that he loses the lawsuit goes to zero




+ + − −
B A Z Z
V
B B A dV V f V Z D Z Z F
0
) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( , and the derivative of this with respect to  A Z  equal
) )( ( A B A Z D Z Z f − − − , which is strictly negative.  By continuity, there exists a value of  A Z
denoted ) (
* *
B A Z Z at which the offender is indifferent between stealing and not, so that for values
of  A Z  above that level, he always steals.   ) (
* *




+ + − − =
B A Z Z
V
B B A dV V f V Z D Z Z F D
* *
0
* * ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( δ (A2)















) ( ) (

















Z D D Z Z f
























Z D Z Z f








+ + + − − Φ − =
ν
ε
ε ε φ ε ν ν δ
B A Z Z
B B A d Z D Z Z D
**
0
* * ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 (. ( A 2 ’ )
Differentiation then yields:  0
) )( (















Z D Z Z








Rewriting (A2), we find:  ∫
−
=
+ + − = −
B A Z Z
V





* * ) ( ) (
1
1 ) ( δ .





















D B D dV V f V Z C
D
Z Z F ,
which implies that when D is sufficiently large, then 
* * *
A D Z Z > .  When D is sufficiently large, the
third term becomes arbitrarily small and it follows that  ) 1 ( ) (
1 * * δ − + ≈
− F Z Z Z B B A .
Proposition 4: Following Proposition 3, when D is sufficiently large, theft occurs when out of
the set of two Z’s drawn in a pair,  ) 1 (
1 δ − > −
− F Z Z Min Max , where  Max Z  represents the greater
value of Z in the pair and  Min Z  represents the lower value of Z in the pair.   We let k =
) 1 (
1 δ −
− F  and  Med Z  denote the median value of Z.  Note that the probability that
k Z Z Min Max > − , equals the probability that  k Z Z > − 2 1  plus the probability that
k Z Z − < − 2 1 .  Given the symmetry of the problem this also equals twice the probability
that  k Z Z > − 1 2 .  Thus, the proof only requires us to show that the mean preserving spread
increases the probability that  0 2 1 > > − k Z Z .
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We now use two lemmas:
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Proof: Since h(Z) represents a single-troughed mean-preserving spread, there exists a q>0 such
that for all values of Z greater than  q ZMed +  or less than  , q ZMed − 0,   h(Z)≥  and otherwise
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Using the fact that  ) (Z Ψ  is increasing for  Med Z Z ≤ , we obtain:
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Hence the result.
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the property that H(Z) equals zero at both extremes), and the lemma follows.
To prove the proposition first notice that from Lemma 3 we obtain
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Using a change of variables and integration by parts exactly as in the proof of Lemma 3, one
verifies that
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Since h is single-troughed, the function ) ( ) ( ) ( k Z H k Z H Z + − − = Ψ  satisfies the hypothesis of
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(A3) and (A4) imply that
Proposition 5: If D is sufficiently large, then an increase in λ  reduces the amount of theft in
society.  Theft occurs when  ) 1 (
1 δ − > −
− F Z Z Min Max  or  ) 1 ( ) )( 1 (
1 δ µ µ λ − > − −
− F Min Max  or
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) (
1 λ δ µ µ − − > −
− F Min Max .  If the distribution of µ  is characterized by a density function
p(.) and a cumulative distribution function P(.) then following the logic of the last proof, we can





1 1 1 ) ( )) ( 1 ( 2
µ
µ µ µ d p k P , where k equals ) 1 /( ) 1 (
1 λ δ − −
− F and





1 1 1 ) ( ) ( 2
µ
µ µ µ d p k p , which is clearly negative.
. 0 ) ( ) ( ≥ + ∫
+∞
∞ −
dZ Z h k Z H38
As a consequence, anything that increases k reduces theft and anything that decreases k increases
theft.  As k is rising λ , this leads to a reduction in the level of theft.
Proposition 6: We denote the returns to investment by W(Z), which equals  D v Z G ) ) ( ( θ − + .  As
Z approaches the maximum value of Z,  ) ( v Z G +  approaches one and investment yields strictly
positive returns.  When Z equals Z , then by assumption the value of W(Z) is negative.  As G(.)
is a continuous, monotonically increasing function,  there must exist a value of Z, denoted  I Z , at
which individuals are indifferent between investing and not investing, i.e. where  θ = + ) ( v Z G I .
For values of Z above  I Z , investing is preferred to not investing, whereas for values of Z below

















, which produces the first two comparative statics.
A mean preserving spread in G(.) causes  D V Z G I ) ( +  to fall (and  I Z  to rise) if and only if
V Z I +  lies above the median value of Z.    The value of  V Z I +  is defined so that
θ = + ) ( ( 1 V Z G , and therefore,  V Z I +  lies above the median of Z if and only if θ  > .5.
If  µ λ λα ) 1 ( − + = Z , then  D P W ) )) 1 /( ( ( ) ( θ λ ν µ µ − − + = , and for the marginal investor,
denoted  I µ ,  θ λ ν µ = − + )) 1 /( ( I P , and differentiation produces 







∂ I , so the
proportion of investors rises with λ .39
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